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 COMMENTS 
Seeking Justice for Grandma: 
Challenging Mandatory Arbitration in 
Nursing Home Contracts 
ANDI ALPER* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Mandatory arbitration provisions in nursing home admission contracts have be-
come rather ubiquitous,1 but there are a variety of legal arguments to refute enforce-
ment of these provisions.2  Arbitration provisions in nursing home admission con-
tracts can be biased in favor of the nursing home and limit available remedies to 
plaintiffs.3  Even though nursing homes may benefit from arbitration, it can be dam-
aging to nursing home residents and their families when residents have been injured 
or killed as a result of the nursing home’s actions or inaction. 
This Comment advocates against the use of mandatory arbitration in nursing 
home admission contracts and discusses various legal theories available to refute 
such clauses.  Part II discusses mandatory arbitration in general and its use in nurs-
ing home admission contracts.  Part III summarizes some of the common arguments 
made in favor of and against arbitration in nursing home admission contracts.  Fi-
nally, Part IV addresses how courts analyze these agreements and possible ap-
proaches to avoid arbitration of disputes arising out of the nursing home contract. 
                                                          
* B.A., Washington University in St. Louis 2013, J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law 
2017. I would like to thank the editorial staff of the Journal of Dispute Resolution for the time spent 
helping edit this Comment. 
     1.  See infra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 2. See infra notes 103-289 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra notes 66-89 and accompanying text. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND NURSING HOME 
CONTRACTS 
A. Origins of Mandatory Arbitration: The Federal Arbitration Act 
During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, courts viewed arbitration4 
with hostility and disapproval.5  In 1925, Congress enacted the United States Arbi-
tration Act,6 codified in 1947 as the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).7  The FAA 
evidenced an attempt to alleviate years of judicial hostility towards arbitration.8  The 
FAA governs the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate disputes in maritime trans-
actions or any contracts involving interstate commerce.9  Section 2 of the FAA, the 
“primary substantive provision of the Act,”10 makes arbitration agreements “valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for 
the revocation of any contract.”11  Under the FAA, arbitration allows parties to enter 
into contracts specifying issues that they have agreed to submit to arbitration.12  In 
theory, mandatory arbitration13 under the FAA improves efficiency within the jus-
tice system by decreasing the number of claims brought in court as well as decreas-
ing the time and costs necessary to resolve disputes.14 
Despite the codification of the FAA in 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court did not 
interpret the FAA favorably until the 1980s.15  In 1983, the Court endorsed Section 
                                                          
 4. Arbitration is defined as “A dispute-resolution process in which the disputing parties choose one 
or more neutral third parties to make a final and binding decision resolving the dispute.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 5. See Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A, v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 984 (2d Cir. 1942); 
Steven J. Burton, The New Judicial Hostility to Arbitration: Federal Preemption, Contract Unconscion-
ability, and Agreements to Arbitrate, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 469, 476; Alison Brooke Overby, Arbitrabil-
ity of Disputes Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1139 (1986); Anjanette H. 
Raymond, It Is Time the Law Begins to Protect Consumers From Significantly One-Sided Arbitration 
Clauses Within Contracts of Adhesion, 91 NEB. L. REV. 666, 668 (2013); Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme 
Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 98 (2012). 
 6. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925). 
 7. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669 (1947) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 
(2012)). 
 8. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13 (1984); Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 
552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008). Both the House Report and Senate Report accompanying this legislation iden-
tified judicial hostility as the impetus for the legislation. H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924) (discussing 
the jurisdictional “jealousy” of the courts and the resulting refusal to enforce arbitration agreements, 
necessitating legislative action). The Senate Report reflects the same sentiment. S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 
2-3 (1924) (discussing resistance to enforcing arbitration agreements and the reasons for that resistance). 
 9. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).  Since the FAA applies to arbitration required by contractual agreements, it 
is considered “mandatory arbitration.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  This Article will 
use the terms “arbitration,” “binding arbitration,” and “mandatory arbitration” interchangeably, but all 
refer to any arbitration required by a contractual agreement. 
 10. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 11. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 12. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995). 
 13. Arbitration required by contractual agreements, like arbitration covered under the FAA, is defined 
as “mandatory arbitration.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  This Article will use the terms 
“arbitration” and “mandatory arbitration” interchangeably, but both refer to any arbitration contained in 
a contract. 
 14. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010). 
 15. Burton, supra note 5, at 476-77 (discussing three cases in the 1980s epitomizing the Supreme 
Court’s federal policy favoring arbitration); Wilson, supra note 5, at 102-06 (discussing the evolution of 
the Supreme Court’s attitude towards arbitration from the 1960s to the 1980s). 
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2 of the FAA as “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”16  The 
Court declared that Section 2 “create[d] a body of federal substantive law of arbi-
trability”17 that is “applicable in state and federal courts.”18  As such, state courts 
may regulate contracts and any arbitration clauses “under general contract law prin-
ciples”;19 they may invalidate an arbitration clause using general contract defenses 
“such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability” without conflicting with the FAA.20  
However, state courts cannot invalidate arbitration agreements solely based on laws 
specific to arbitration or laws that undermine the strong federal policy favoring ar-
bitration.21  Because of this policy and the encouragement of the Supreme Court, 
mandatory arbitration agreements have become common in various types of con-
sumer contracts,22 especially in nursing home23 admission contracts.24 
B. Use of Mandatory Arbitration in Nursing Home Admission Con-
tracts 
Admitting a loved one into a nursing home is an emotional and exhausting pro-
cess that often takes place under emergent circumstances.25  Typically, a worried 
child or spouse must find a safe refuge that can provide the immediately necessary 
care for a physically or mentally frail family member.26  The decision to admit a 
loved one is a stressful one, whether it is temporary or permanent.27  Since the need 
                                                          
 16. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).  See Southland 
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (“In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national 
policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the reso-
lution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration.”). 
 17. Moses, 460 U.S. at 24. 
 18. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984). 
 19. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995). 
 20. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). 
 21. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339, 343 (2011) (holding that the FAA does 
not preserve state laws that contradict the purpose of the FAA). 
 22. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1631 
(2005). 
 23. “Nursing home,” as defined under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396g(e)(1) (2012), in-
cludes “any institution or facility defined as such for licensing purposes under State law, or, if State law 
does not employ the term nursing home, the equivalent term or terms as determined by the Secretary, 
but does not include a religious nonmedical health care institution.” 
 24. Nora Lockwood Tooher, Arbitration Agreements in Nursing Home Admissions Becoming Wide-
spread, LAWYERS WEEKLY USA (Sept. 27, 2004).  In the late 1990s, a number of juries awarded exor-
bitantly high damages to nursing home residents in personal injuries suits, so many nursing homes re-
sponded by including binding arbitration agreements in their admission contracts.  Nathan Koppel, Nurs-
ing Homes, in Bid to Cut Costs, Prod Patients to Forgo Lawsuits; Big Payouts Fade As Arbitration 
Rises; Ms. Hight Falls Ill, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 11, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/arti-
cle/SB120786025242805879.html. 
 25. See Cynthia L. Barrett, Dealing With Facility Admissions Agreements, SL071 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 231, 238 (2006); Amy Parise DeLaney, Maneuvering the Labyrinth of Long-
Term Care Admissions Contracts, 4 NAT’L ACAD. ELDER L. ATTY’S J. 35, 37 (2008) (“Contracts be-
tween seniors needing care and facilities providing care are often presented at difficult and inopportune 
times, fraught with significant emotion, stress, and often, guilt.”); Denese Ashbaugh Vlosky et al., “Say-
so”As a Predictor of Nursing Home Readiness, 93 J. FAM. & CONSUMER SCIS. 59, 59 (2001) (“Nursing 
home placement often follows a major health crisis when decisions have to be made quickly.”). 
 26. Barrett, supra note 25. 
 27. Maureen Armour, A Nursing Home’s Good Faith Duty “To” Care: Redefining A Fragile Rela-
tionship Using the Law of Contract, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 217, 225 (1994); Ann E. Krasuski, Comment, 
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements Do Not Belong in Nursing Home Contracts with Residents, 8 
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for nursing home care often arises unexpectedly,28 many new residents and their 
families do not read the admission contract carefully,29 nor do they possess adequate 
business acumen to understand the arbitration agreement or the rights they may be 
signing away.30  Moreover, these complicated legal agreements often comprise just 
one of many documents in many nursing home admission packages31 that must be 
signed prior to or immediately upon admission.32 
Nursing homes routinely include arbitration provisions in their admission con-
tracts.33  In fact, “most of the nation’s largest nursing home chains, including Inte-
grated Health Services, Beverly Industries, Kindred Healthcare, and Mariner, in-
clude arbitration agreements in their admissions packets.”34  Mandatory arbitration 
agreements in nursing home admission contracts received national attention in Mar-
met Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown,35 in which the U.S. Supreme Court deter-
mined that the FAA preempted any state law or public policy limiting arbitration, 
with no exception for claims of personal injury or wrongful death.36  The decision 
illustrated the Court’s “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolu-
tion.”37  Notwithstanding the Court’s Decision in Marmet, mandatory arbitration in 
nursing home admission contracts has become a highly contested area of law,38 and 
state courts have reached widely different results when faced with the enforceability 
of arbitration agreements in nursing home admission contracts.39 
                                                          
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 263-64 (2004) (noting that admission into nursing homes is a time of ex-
treme stress for admittees and their families). 
 28. Krasuski, supra note 27, at 302. 
 29. Krasuski, supra note 27, at 263-64. 
 30. Jana Pavlic, Reverse Pre-Empting the Federal Arbitration Act: Alleviating the Arbitration Crisis 
in Nursing Homes, 22 J.L. & HEALTH 375, 385 (2009). 
 31. Armour, supra note 27, at 225 n.35 (describing an admissions packet that contains fifty-one sep-
arate items). 
 32. Michelle Andrews, You Don’t Have to Sign Away Your Right to Take a Nursing Home to Court, 
WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2012), http://search.proquest.com/docview/1040744968?accountid=14576; 
Kelly Bagby & Samantha Souza, Ending Unfair Arbitration: Fighting Against the Enforcement of Arbi-
tration Agreements in Long-Term Care Contracts, 29 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 183, 185-86 
(2013). 
 33. Laura M. Owings & Mark N. Geller, The Inherent Unfairness of Arbitration Agreements in Nurs-
ing Home Admission Contracts, 43 TENN. B.J. 20, 20 (Mar. 2007). 
 34. Krasuski, supra note 27, at 268. 
 35. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012) (per curiam). 
 36. Id. at 1203.  However, the Supreme Court remanded the case for consideration of whether, absent 
the public policy rationale against arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts, the arbitration 
clauses at issue “are unenforceable under state common law principles that are not specific to arbitration 
and pre-empted by the FAA.” Id. at 1204. 
 37. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc., 565 U.S. at 533 (quoting KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 132 S. Ct. 23, 25 
(2011) (per curiam)). 
 38. See Reed R. Bates & Stephen W. Still, Jr., Arbitration in Nursing Home Cases: Trends, Issues, 
and A Glance into the Future, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 282, 282 (2009); Katherine Palm, Arbitration Clauses 
in Nursing Home Admission Agreements: Framing the Debate, 14 ELDER L. J. 453, 453 (2006). 
 39. See, e.g., Mathews v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 177 P.3d 867, 871 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (re-
quiring arbitration of all claims); Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., 976 N.E.2d 344, 360 (Ill. 2012) 
(requiring arbitration of the Nursing Home Care Act claim but not the wrongful death claim); Miller v. 
Cotter, 863 N.E.2d 537, 540 (Mass. 2007) (holding the same); Lawrence v. Beverly Manor, 273 S.W.3d 
525, 529, 530 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) (holding arbitration not required); Texas Cityview Care Ctr., L.P. v. 
Fryer, 227 S.W.3d 345, 354 (Tex. App. 2007) (holding arbitration not required). 
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III. DEBATING MANDATORY ARBITRATION IN NURSING HOME ADMISSION 
CONTRACTS 
A. Policy Arguments in Favor of Mandatory Arbitration 
Proponents of mandatory arbitration believe the agreements are a cost-effective 
and time-efficient tool.40  Arbitration is more informal than litigation,41 “reducing 
the cost and increasing the speed of dispute resolution.”42  The informality of arbi-
tration “enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious means 
for dispute resolution.”43  A 2015 study on liability claim costs in the long term care 
profession in the United States reveals that “claims resolved under arbitration agree-
ments have a lower cost and settle more quickly.”44 
Moreover, arbitration enhances party autonomy because parties can design the 
dispute resolution process and tailor the arbitration to the needs of their case.45  Spe-
cifically, “[a]rbitration eases the burden on clogged court dockets; it offers parties 
an opportunity to submit disputes to one experienced in that field of business.”46  
The U.S. Supreme Court also believes that the “discretion in designing arbitration 
processes . . . allow[s] for efficient, streamlined procedures tailored to the type of 
dispute,” which reduces the cost and time of resolving disputes.47  As such, arbitra-
tion improves efficiency by sending disputes to the appropriate forum “for proactive 
treatment and resolution.”48 
In the health care context, nursing homes favor arbitration over litigation be-
cause arbitrators often grant lower awards than juries.49  Juries notoriously award 
exorbitantly high damages to victims of nursing home negligence.50  For example, 
in a negligence suit against a nursing home, a resident died “from dehydration as a 
                                                          
 40. Letter from Keith B. Nelson, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, to Senator Patrick J. 
Leahy, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (July 30, 2008), http://www.citi-
zen.org/documents/DOJ%20-%2007-30-08%20Ltr.pdf. 
 41. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1974) (“The record of the arbitration 
proceeding is not as complete [as judicial proceedings]; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and 
rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, 
and testimony under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable.”). 
 42. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 345 (2011).  See also Birkey Design Grp., 
Inc. v. Egle Nursing Home, Inc., 687 A.2d 256, 258 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (“Arbitration is an in-
formal, expeditious, and inexpensive alternative to conventional litigation.”); Burton, supra note 5, at 
481 (Arbitration is “quicker and cheaper for the parties than litigation, even after the costs and fees are 
taken into account.”). 
 43. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58. 
 44. AON GLOBAL RISK CONSULTING, LONG TERM CARE GENERAL LIABILITY AND PROFESSIONAL 
LIABILITY ACTUARIAL ANALYSIS 3 (2015), https://www.ahcancal.org/research_data/liability/Docu-
ments/2015%20General%20Liability%20and%20Professional%20Liability%20Actuarial%20Analy-
sis%20Report.pdf. 
 45. Burton, supra note 5, at 479. 
 46. Birkey Design Grp., Inc., 687 A.2d at 258. 
 47. AT&T Mobility LLC, 563 U.S. at 344-45; see also Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58 (“Indeed, it is the 
informality of arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious 
means for dispute resolution.”). 
 48. Karen Ignagni, Liability and Health Care: Time for a Fresh Approach, 10 METRO. CORP. COUNS. 
34, 34 (2004). 
 49. Alan Bloom et al., Alternative Dispute Resolution in Health Care, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 61, 76 
(1995). 
 50. See Krasuski, supra note 27, at 266-67.  From 1995 to 1998, jury awards of compensatory damages 
have increased four times to an average of $1.3 million.  Id. at 266. 
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consequence of neglect that resulted from the understaffing of [the nursing 
home].”51  The jury awarded the plaintiff “$11.5 million in compensatory damages 
and $80 million in punitive damages.”52  On appeal, the court reduced damages to 
just under $4.6 million in compensatory damages and almost $32 million in punitive 
damages.53 
Proponents believe that reducing the costs of litigation through arbitration is 
the best solution to exorbitant jury awards.54  High jury awards cause nursing homes 
to increase their rates, which leads to higher costs for patients and their families and 
may leave potential nursing home residents without care.55  High jury awards also 
result in increasing costs of insurance to nursing homes, consequently increasing 
rates for patient insurance.56  By lowering awards, arbitration helps nursing homes 
combat the increasing cost of insurance.57  Finally, lower awards allow nursing 
homes to focus financial resources on patients’ care rather than litigation.58  Specif-
ically, by allocating money towards hiring more nursing home employees, arbitra-
tion helps combat understaffing, which “jeopardize[s] the health and safety of [nurs-
ing home] residents.”59 
Arbitration is also gaining public support.  One survey indicates that from 1999 
to 2003, the number of Americans who preferred arbitration over a lawsuit for mon-
etary damages increased by 5 percent from 59 percent to 64 percent.60  Supporters 
of arbitration point to the national policy favoring arbitration and recommend that 
state governments should enact arbitration policies that balance the power of the 
contracting parties to protect patient interests, thus legitimizing arbitration as a dis-
pute resolution method for nursing homes and their residents.61 
B. Policy Arguments Against Mandatory Arbitration 
Despite the frequency of arbitration provisions in nursing home admission con-
tracts, mandatory arbitration agreements in nursing home admission contracts face 
intense opposition.62   Opponents of mandatory arbitration agreements in nursing 
home admission contracts include congressional representatives63 and the American 
                                                          
 51. Manor Care, Inc. v. Douglas, 763 S.E.2d 73, 106-07 (W. Va. 2014). 
 52. Id. at 80. 
 53. Id. at 94 (reducing compensatory damages to $4,594,615.22 and punitive damages to 
$31,978,521.93). 
 54. Margaret Baumer, Keep Arbitration Alive: Why the Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act 
Should Not Be Passed, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 155, 157 (2010). 
 55. Baumer, supra note 54, at 173. 
 56. Baumer, supra note 54, at 173. 
 57. Krasuski, supra note 27, at 266; Andrews, supra note 32. 
 58. Koppel, supra note 24. 
 59. Manor Care, Inc. v. Douglas, 763 S.E.2d 73, 96 (W. Va. 2014). 
 60. NAT’L ARBITRATION FORUM, THE CASE FOR PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: 
EFFECTIVE AND AFFORDABLE ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR CONSUMERS EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND SURVEY 
RESULTS 9 (2004), http://www.adrforum.com/rcontrol/documents/ResearchStudiesAndStatis-
tics/2004EmpiricalStudies.pdf. 
 61. Baumer, supra note 54, at 173. 
 62. Palm, supra note 38, at 454. 
 63. Letter from Senators to Andy Slavitt, Acting Administrator, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (Sept. 23, 2015), https://www.franken.senate.gov/files/documents/150923CMSArbitration.pdf 
(requesting a prohibition of binding pre-dispute arbitration clauses in long-term care facility contracts). 
In 2009, Senators tried but failed to pass “The Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act,” which would 
amend the FAA to make “pre-dispute arbitration agreement between a long-term care facility and a 
6
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2016, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2016/iss2/10
No. 2] Seeking Justice for Grandma 475 
Arbitration Association,64 the largest arbitration provider worldwide.65  The Amer-
ican Arbitration Association believes that many nursing home residents are not in 
the appropriate state of mind to evaluate arbitration agreements.66  While consumer 
arbitration agreements preclude the litigation of contract claims, arbitration agree-
ments in nursing home contracts prevent residents from trying any tort claims, such 
as negligence or abuse, before a jury.67 
Moreover, nursing homes and residents have inherently and grossly unequal 
bargaining power68 because nursing homes draft admission contracts and can tailor 
terms to their advantage.69  Such terms are typically nonnegotiable.70  As a result, 
critics argue that almost all nursing home admission agreements are adhesion con-
tracts71 that are “drafted and ‘imposed’ by a strong party on another with less bar-
gaining power.”72  In July 2015, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
proposed changes for binding arbitration agreements for long-term care facilities 
such as nursing homes73 because of their concern “that the facilities’ superior bar-
gaining power could result in a resident feeling coerced into signing the agree-
ment.”74  Although contracts of adhesion “are not automatically void,”75 they make 
it easier to argue that the agreement is substantively unconscionable.76 
                                                          
resident of a long-term care facility (or anyone acting on behalf of such a resident, including a person 
with financial responsibility for that resident)” invalid and unenforceable. Fairness in Nursing Home 
Arbitration Act, S. 512, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 64. Koppel, supra note 24 (writing that the American Arbitration Association disapproves of manda-
tory arbitration in disputes over nursing-home care and generally refuses such cases). 
 65. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, Dispute Resolution Services, https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/ser-
vices/disputeresolutionservices (last visited Nov. 20, 2015). 
 66. Koppel, supra note 24. 
 67. Krasuski, supra note 27, at 292 (“[A]rbitration agreements in nursing homes deny vulnerable in-
dividuals who have been neglected or abused by their caregivers the opportunity to raise tort claims in 
court.”). 
 68. Bagby & Souza, supra note 32, at 187. 
 69. Krasuski, supra note 27, at 267; Paul Bland, Fighting Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 48 TRIAL 
22, 24 (OCT. 2012). 
 70. See Miller v. Cotter, 863 N.E.2d 537, 548 n.16 (Mass. 2007) (finding a contract of adhesion be-
cause the nursing home provided the terms of the contract and the contract was not the subject of active 
negotiation); Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So. 
3d 695, 701 (Miss. 2009) (citation omitted) (holding that nursing home admission contracts were con-
tracts of adhesion when the contracts were “drafted unilaterally by the dominant party and then presented 
on a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ basis to the weaker party who has no real opportunity to bargain about its 
terms.”). 
 71. GEORGE J. AGICH, DEPENDENCE AND AUTONOMY IN OLD AGE 26 (2003); Suzanne Gallagher, 
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Nursing Admission Agreements: The Rights of Elders, 3 NAELA J. 
187, 188 (2007). 
 72. Burton, supra note 5, at 479.  See also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 600 
(1991) (defining adhesion contracts as “form contracts offered on a take-or-leave basis by a party with 
stronger bargaining power to a party with weaker power.”). 
 73. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Reform of Requirements for Long-Term Care Facilities, 80 
Fed. Reg. 42168, 42211 (proposed July 16, 2015).  The proposed rule requires facilities to explain arbi-
tration agreements to residents and select a neutral arbitrator in a venue convenient to both parties.  The 
rule also requires that binding arbitration agreements be entered into voluntarily, not as a condition of 
admission. Finally, arbitration agreements should be completely separate agreements, not included in 
“any other agreement or paperwork addressing any other issues.”  Id. 
 74. Id. The proposed rule also suggests that “the increasing prevalence of these agreements could be 
detrimental to residents’ health and safety.”  Id. 
 75. E. Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 716 (Miss. 2002); Hughes Training, Inc. v. Cook, 254 
F.3d 588, 593 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 76. Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds, 14 So. 3d 695, 701 (Miss. 2009). 
See discussion infra Part IV, Sec. 4. 
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In addition, mandatory arbitration agreements in nursing home admission con-
tracts may identify “industry-friendly” arbitrators or hold proceedings at locations 
inconvenient for residents.77  Nursing homes can also avoid plaintiff-friendly stat-
utes by requiring a shorter length of time to file complaints than state statutes of 
limitation and limiting damages by instituting caps below statutory caps or exclud-
ing attorney’s fees, which do not have statutory limits.78 
Additionally, the unique nature of the typical nursing home admission experi-
ence likely puts elderly residents at a severe bargaining disadvantage.79  Admittance 
into a nursing home is an emotional experience occurring in a tense and unfamiliar 
setting,80 often in response to an urgent and sudden need.81  As a result, the admittee 
may not have the opportunity to read carefully the admission contracts or have time 
to seek and carefully consider alternative facilities.82  Therefore, critics believe it is 
disingenuous for nursing homes to claim later that the resident or the resident’s 
family member “consciously, knowingly and deliberately accepted an arbitration 
clause in the contract” that would preclude them from having a jury decide whether 
a nursing home negligently injured or killed the resident.83  These notable aspects 
of the nursing home admission process make mandatory arbitration agreements in 
admission contracts more harmful than arbitration agreements in other situations.84 
The nature of arbitration itself may disadvantage nursing home residents and 
their families.  For example, arbitration lacks public accountability since arbitration 
hearings are confidential.85  Additionally, it is more difficult to appeal arbitration 
than a court ruling.86  Arbitration agreements often cap the amount that a plaintiff 
can recover in damages, and even those with no cap tend to result in lower awards 
than a trial would typically produce.87  Finally, by compelling plaintiffs to argue 
their claims in arbitration rather than court, nursing homes make it more difficult 
for such claimants to obtain attorneys.88  Attorneys who take cases on contingent 
fees may refuse to arbitrate claims because the likely lower recovery in arbitration 
will not be adequate compensation for the case.89 
                                                          
 77. Baumer, supra note 54, at 171. 
 78. Baumer, supra note 54, at 171. 
 79. Krasuski, supra note 27, at 263-64 (noting that the need for nursing care often arises unexpectedly 
and that admission is a time of extreme stress for residents and their families, during which they sign 
arbitration agreements as one of a number of documents given to them at the same time). 
 80. Richard Dollinger, New Battle Over the Future of Elder Care: Arbitration vs. Litigation, N.Y. L.J. 
(July 2, 2013), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202609219115&New_Battle_Over_the_Fu-
ture_of_Elder_Care_Arbitration_vs_Litigation. 
 81. Krasuski, supra note 27, at 264. 
 82. Bagby & Souza, supra note 32, at 187; Palm, supra note 38, at 459. 
 83. Dollinger, supra note 80. 
 84. Palm, supra note 38, at 459. 
 85. WILLIAM A. KAPLAN & BARBARA A. LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION 74 (2007). 
 86. See Nan Aron, Leveling the Legal Playing Field: Limit Forced Arbitration, 
L.A. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/commentary/ 
la-oe-aron-arbitration-contracts-instagram-20140114,0,397221 0.story#axzz2r5Jx 11 
MO. 
 87. See Jessica Fargen, Nursing Home Residents Often Sign Away Rights to Sue, BOS. HERALD (Mar. 
8, 2010), http://www.bostonherald.com/news_opinion/local_coverage/2010/03/nursing_home_resi-
dents_often_sign_away_rights_sue. 
 88. Sternlight, supra note 22, at 1654. 
 89. Sternlight, supra note 22, at 1654.  The average recovery in arbitration is lower than the average 
recovery in litigation. See, e.g., Lewis L. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 
U.S.F. L. REV. 105, 114-15 (2003). 
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Notwithstanding the justifications for and against arbitration in nursing home 
contracts, a court must determine the applicable law, if a valid agreement to arbitrate 
exists, “and whether the specific dispute falls within the scope of that agreement.”90 
IV. CHALLENGING MANDATORY ARBITRATION IN NURSING HOME 
ADMISSION CONTRACTS 
A. Applicable Law and Contract Validity 
As a preliminary matter, courts must determine what federal or state law gov-
erns the arbitration agreement.91  The FAA only applies to arbitration agreements 
involving interstate commerce,92 and the Supreme Court has interpreted “interstate 
commerce” broadly.93  The underlying admissions agreement at issue must involve 
interstate commerce for the FAA to apply.94  Therefore, a nursing home’s interstate 
activities determine whether the FAA governs arbitration agreements between nurs-
ing homes and residents.95 
Courts have considered the receipt of materials from other states, treatment of 
patients from other states, any out-of-state offices, and the receipt of Medicare funds 
in determining whether the agreement involved “interstate commerce.”96  In Dean 
v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, the Supreme Court of South Carolina 
held that the nursing home residency contract implicated the FAA because “nursing 
home residency contracts usually entail providing residents with meals and medical 
                                                          
 90. Houlihan v. Offerman & Co., 31 F.3d 692, 694-95 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 91. Suzanne M. Scheller, Arbitrating Wrongful Death Claims for Nursing Home Patients: What Is 
Wrong with This Picture and How to Make It “More” Right, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 527, 536 (2008). 
 92. 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 93. Paetzold v. Am. Sterling Corp., 247 S.W.3d 69, 72 (Mo. App. W.D. 2008) (describing “interstate 
commerce” as functionally equivalent to “affecting commerce”); see also Ping v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 
376 S.W.3d 581, 589 (Ky. 2012) (“Congress’s commerce power is interpreted broadly.”). 
 94. See Terminix Int’l, Inc. v. Rice, 904 So. 2d 1051, 1054 (Miss. 2004) (applying the FAA to arbi-
tration provisions in contracts involving commerce); Transouth Fin. Corp. v. Bell, 739 So. 2d 1110, 1114 
(Ala. 1999). (“The party seeking to compel arbitration has the burden of proving the existence of a con-
tract calling for arbitration and proving that that contract evidences a transaction affecting interstate 
commerce.”). 
 95. See Cmty. Care of Am. of Ala., Inc. v. Davis, 850 So. 2d 283, 288–89 (Ala. 2002) (finding the 
FAA did not apply because the nursing home’s activities were primarily intrastate, not interstate); 
McGuffey Health & Rehab. Ctr. v. Jackson, 864 So. 2d 1061, 1063 (Ala. 2003) (considered Medicare 
funds moving across state lines to determine if an agreement substantially affects interstate commerce). 
 96. See also Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 329 (1991) (holding that purchase of out-
of-state medicines and acceptance of out-of-state insurance established interstate commerce); Briarcliff 
Nursing Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, 894 So. 2d 661, 668 (Ala. 2004) (finding nursing home admission con-
tract substantially affected interstate commerce because owner of nursing home had regional office in 
Florida, headquarters in Maryland, provided services to several patients from outside of Alabama, and 
received regular shipments of supplies from other states); Triad Health Mgmt. of Ga., III, LLC v. John-
son, 679 S.E.2d 785, 787–88 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (applying FAA to nursing home admission contract 
because facility purchased supplies from out-of-state vendors, treated out-of-state patients, and  had pa-
tients insured through Medicaid and Medicare); Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Lumpkin 
ex rel. Lumpkin, 23 So. 3d 1092, 1095 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (holding FAA governed nursing home 
admissions agreement because agreement evidenced economic activity affecting interstate commerce in 
the aggregate); McIntosh v. Tenet Health Sys. Hosps., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 85, 88 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) 
(finding arbitration agreement subject to FAA because employer treated out-of-state patients, received 
goods and services from out-of-state vendors, and received reimbursement from out-of-state and multi-
state insurers, and employee’s position as drug counselor facilitated and affected employer’s business 
activities). 
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supplies that are inevitably shipped across state lines from out-of-state vendors.”97  
Additionally, since the U.S. Supreme Court has held that health care is “a form of 
economic activity involving interstate commerce, state and federal courts across the 
country . . . have recognized that nursing home admission contracts are subject to 
the FAA.”98 
Since arbitration agreements are contracts,99 valid arbitration agreements “must 
conform to the rules governing contracts.”100  Therefore, courts must first determine 
whether a valid contract exists before assessing the validity of the arbitration provi-
sion.101  In fact, the FAA requires the “party seeking to compel arbitration . . . [to 
prove] the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate.”102  To prove a valid agree-
ment to arbitrate existed, there must be proof of a valid contract.103 
State laws governing contract formation determine whether a valid contract ex-
ists.104  Generally, valid contracts require “(1) two or more contracting parties, (2) 
consideration, (3) an agreement that is sufficiently definite, (4) parties with legal 
capacity to make a contract, (5) mutual assent, and (6) no legal prohibition preclud-
ing contract formation.”105  Importantly, valid contracts require complete and vol-
untary assent to the contract terms by parties with the capacity to enter into a con-
tract.106 
                                                          
 97. Dean v. Heritage Healthcare of Ridgeway, LLC, 759 S.E.2d 727, 732 (2014). 
 98. Extendicare Homes, Inc. v. Whisman, 478 S.W.3d 306, 338 (Ky. 2015), as corrected (Oct. 9, 
2015), reh’g denied (Feb. 18, 2016), cert. granted sub nom. Kindred Nursing Centers Ltd. P’ship v. 
Clark, 137 S. Ct. 368 (2016).  See, e.g., Cook v. GGNSC Ripley, LLC, 786 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1166 (N.D. 
Miss. 2011); Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 2012 IL 113204, ¶ 16; Barker v. Evangelical 
Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1266 (D.N.M. 2010); Estate of Eckstein ex rel. 
Luckey v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1240 (E.D. Wash. 2009); Triad Health 
Mgmt. of Ga., III, LLC v. Johnson, 679 S.E.2d 785, 788 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).  See also Owens v. Coosa 
Valley Health Care, Inc., 890 So. 2d 983, 988 (Ala. 2004) (holding that a contract for nursing home 
services involved interstate commerce); McGuffey Health & Rehab. Ctr. v. Gibson ex rel. Jackson, 864 
So. 2d 1061, 1063 (Ala. 2003) (holding that a nursing home admissions agreement had a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce because most of money and materials used to treat and care for a resident 
came out-of-state sources and vendors). But see Bruner v. Timberlane Manor Ltd. P’ship, 2006 OK 90, 
¶ 42, 155 P.3d 16, 30-31 (holding a nursing home contract did not constitute interstate commerce because 
the transactions involved, despite being economic activities, did not substantially impact interstate com-
merce when viewed in the aggregate, since the resident was from Oklahoma and the nursing home was 
located in and licensed by Oklahoma). 
 99. Hogsett v. Parkwood Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1323 (N.D. Ga. 2014) 
(finding that “an arbitration agreement is still a contract”). 
 100. State ex rel. AMFM, LLC v. King, 740 S.E.2d 66, 73 (W. Va. 2013). 
 101. TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Rooks, 604 S.E.2d 562, 564 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004). 
 102. Ping v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 590 (Ky. 2012). 
 103. See Byrd v. Simmons, 5 So. 3d 384, 388 (Miss. 2009) (citing Grenada Living Ctr., LLC, v. Cole-
man, 961 So. 2d 33, 36-37 (Miss. 2007)). 
 104. Ping, 376 S.W.3d at 590. 
 105. Grenada Living Ctr., LLC v. Coleman, 961 So. 2d 33, 37 (Miss. 2007); GGNSC Batesville, LLC 
v. Johnson, 109 So. 3d 562, 565 (Miss. 2013) (quoting Adams Cmty. Care Ctr. , LLC v. Reed, 37 So. 3d 
1155, 1158 (Miss. 2010)).  See also Wallace v. Shreve Mem’l Library, 79 F.3d 427, 430 n.4 (5th Cir. 
1996) (“Four elements are required for a valid contract: (1) the parties must possess the capacity to 
contract; (2) the parties’ mutual consent must be freely given; (3) there must be a certain object for the 
contract; and (4) the contract must have a lawful purpose.”); State ex rel. AMFM, LLC, 740 S.E.2d at 73 
(“Accordingly, to be valid, the subject Arbitration Agreement must have (1) competent parties; (2) legal 
subject matter; (3) valuable consideration; and (4) mutual assent.”). 
 106. Conners v. Eble, 269 S.W.2d 716, 717-18 (Ky. 1954). 
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B. Challenges to Arbitration Agreements in Nursing Home Contracts 
Courts that refused to enforce mandatory arbitration clauses in nursing home 
admission contracts have relied on standard contract defenses to invalidate the 
agreement, thus still complying with the FAA.107  The most common challenges to 
an arbitration agreement in a nursing home admission contract include signatory 
issues, such as claims “that a signatory lacked the authority to commit his principal 
[the resident], or that the signor lacked the mental capacity to assent.”108  Addition-
ally, parties often argue that arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts are 
unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.109 
1. Lack of Capacity 
Courts review arbitration agreements based on the applicable state law on con-
tract formation.110  Since arbitration is a matter of a contract,111 valid arbitration 
agreements require mutual assent by competent parties with “capacity to con-
tract.”112  Lack of capacity is a “general defense to any contract formation,” so the 
laws of the state governing the contract will determine the availability of this de-
fense.113 
Generally, a party lacks capacity to contract if he or she lacks “sufficient mental 
capacity to understand the nature and effect of the particular transaction.”114  A party 
has capacity to contract if he or she has the “ability to understand in a meaningful 
                                                          
 107. Bagby & Souza, supra note 32, at 188. 
 108. Wiand v. Schneiderman, 778 F.3d 917, 924 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 109. Bates & Still, Jr., supra note 38, at 285; Gallagher, supra note 71, at 194. 
 110. Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 507 F.3d 967, 972 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 111. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995). 
 112. Conners v. Eble, 269 S.W.2d 716, 717-18 (Ky. 1954).  See also Farrar v. United States, 30 U.S. 
373, 378 (1831) (“To make a valid contract, the party must not only have a capacity to contract, but the 
means of exercising that capacity by expressing their assent to its stipulations.”); Wallace v. Shreve 
Mem’l Library, 79 F.3d 427, 430 n.4 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying Louisiana law, valid contracts require 
“(1) the parties must possess the capacity to contract; (2) the parties’ mutual consent must be freely 
given; (3) there must be a certain object for the contract; and (4) the contract must have a lawful pur-
pose.”); Wilkerson ex rel. Estate of Wilkerson v. Nelson, 395 F. Supp. 2d 281, 286 (M.D.N.C. 2005) 
(applying North Carolina law, a valid contract “requires offer, acceptance, consideration, mutual assent, 
and the presence of no valid defenses for contract formation.”); Pine Hills Health & Rehab., LLC v. 
Matthews, 431 S.W.3d 910, 915 (Ark. 2014) (“The essential elements of a contract are competent parties, 
subject matter, legal consideration, mutual agreement, and mutual obligations.”); Grenada Living Ctr., 
LLC v. Coleman, 961 So. 2d 33, 37 (Miss. 2007) (applying Mississippi law, valid contracts require 
mutual assent between two or more parties with the legal capacity to make contracts). 
 113. Rowan v. Brookdale Senior Living Cmtys., Inc., No. 1:13-CV-1261, 2015 WL 9906264, at *4 
(W.D. Mich. June 1, 2015).  See infra notes 101-23 and accompanying text. 
 114. McElroy v. Mathews, 263 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Mo. 1953).  See also Ortelere v. Teachers’ Ret. Bd., 250 
N.E.2d 460, 464 (N.Y. 1969) (finding incapacity to contract when a party is “wholly and absolutely 
incompetent to comprehend and understand the nature of the transaction.”) (quoting Aldrich v. Bailey, 
30 N.E. 264, 265 (N.Y. 1892)); Shippers Exp. v. Chapman, 364 So. 2d 1097, 1100 (Miss. 1978) (apply-
ing Mississippi law, the test for mental competency is whether, at the time of contract execution, a party’s 
“mind [is] so unsound, or . . . so weak in mind, or so imbecile, no matter from what cause, that he cannot 
manage the ordinary affairs of life.”). 
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way, at the time the contract is executed, the nature, scope and effect of the con-
tract.”115 
However, parties to a contract are presumed competent and capable of under-
standing the nature and effect of his or her actions.116  A party arguing “that an entire 
contract containing an arbitration provision is unenforceable because [the signor] 
lacked the mental capacity to enter into the contract”117 bears the burden of proving 
incapacity.118  Proof of incapacity depends on the facts regarding a party’s mental 
condition at the time he or she executed the contract.119 
In Landers v. Integrated Health Services of Shreveport, a Louisiana court held 
that the nursing home resident lacked capacity at the time she signed the arbitration 
agreement since the resident’s nursing home medical records demonstrated that the 
resident required 24-hour professional nursing supervision and was forgetful, de-
pressed, and suffering from schizophrenia.120  The court refused to enforce the ar-
bitration agreement because the nursing home knew about the resident’s lack of 
capacity at the time she signed the arbitration agreement because the nursing home 
had a duty to conduct neurological and cognitive assessment when she was admit-
ted.121 
Similarly, a Mississippi district court concluded that a nursing home resident 
lacked mental capacity to enter into an arbitration agreement.122  Applying Missis-
sippi law, the court determined that at the time the resident signed the agreement, 
he lacked the capacity to “manage the ordinary affairs of life,” such as making co-
herent decisions regarding “important personal, business, and life” matters.123  Spe-
                                                          
 115. Gaddy v. Douglass, 597 S.E.2d 12, 20 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004).  See also Ortelere, 250 N.E.2d at 464 
(defining capacity to contract as the ability to make “a rational judgment concerning the particular trans-
action.”); Cundick v. Broadbent, 383 F.2d 157, 160 (10th Cir. 1967) (“[M]ental capacity to contract 
depends upon whether the allegedly disabled person possessed sufficient reason to enable him to under-
stand the nature and effect of the act in issue.”); Bitler Inv. Venture II, LLC v. Marathon Ashland Petro., 
LLC, 779 F. Supp. 2d 858, 883 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (holding that capacity to contract requires a person to 
understand the nature and effect of his or her act on the date of the agreement). 
 116. See, e.g., Simmons First Nat’l Bank v. Luzader, 438 S.W.2d 25, 27 (Ark. 1969) (“There is a pre-
sumption of law that every man is sane, fully competent and capable of understanding the nature and 
effect of his contracts.”); Feiden v. Feiden, 542 N.Y.S.2d 860, 862 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (“A party’s 
competence is presumed and the party asserting incapacity bears the burden of proving incompetence.”). 
 117. Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1273 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 118. See Feiden, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 862 (“[T]he party asserting incapacity bears the burden of proving 
incompetence.”); Dalon v. Ruleville Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, No. 415CV00086DMBJMV, 2016 
WL 498432, at *5 (N.D. Miss. Feb. 8, 2016) (holding that party asserting mental incapacity must prove 
incapacity by a “preponderance of proof”); Rawlings v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 
291, 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (“[P]ersons seeking to invalidate a contract for mental incapacity have 
the burden of proving that one or both of the contracting parties were mentally incompetent when the 
contract was formed.”). 
 119. Bitler Inv. Venture II, LLC, 779 F. Supp. 2d at 883 (holding that capacity to enter into a contract 
requires a person to understand the nature and effect of his or her act on the date of the agreement).  See 
also Cmty. Care Ctr. of Vicksburg, LLC v. Mason, 966 So. 2d 220, 230-31 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (find-
ing a valid arbitration agreement existed because no evidence suggested resident lacked capacity to enter 
into a contract at the time she signed the arbitration clause); Brown v. United Mo. Bank, N.A., 78 F.3d 
382, 386 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Evidence of the person’s mental condition before and after execution can be 
sufficient if it provides a reasonable inference of incompetency at the time of execution.”). 
 120. Landers v. Integrated Health Servs. of Shreveport, 39,739, p. 3-4 (La. App. 2 Cir. 5/11/05), 903 
So. 2d 609, 612. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Liberty Health & Rehab of Indianola, LLC v. Howarth, 11 F. Supp. 3d 684, 688 (N.D. Miss. 2014). 
 123. Id. at 687. 
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cifically, testimony that the resident “was unable, on the date he signed the arbitra-
tion agreement, to state what year it was, within five years” evidenced “a profound 
diminishment of mental capacity and a significant disconnect from reality.”124  As 
a result, the court denied the motion to compel arbitration because of the resident’s 
lack of competency.125 
In contrast, a Mississippi state court held that a resident with schizophrenia had 
the necessary legal capacity to contract because he had a wife and children and 
managed his own money, hired an attorney to file lawsuits, and testified “coherently 
and competently at his discovery depositions.”126  In Estate of Etting v. Regents 
Park at Aventura, Inc., the District Court of Appeals of Florida found that a nursing 
home resident’s legal blindness at the time she signed the agreement did not render 
her incapable of assenting to the agreement.127 
When a resident signs a nursing home admission contract containing an arbi-
tration provision, raising an incapacity defense may prevent arbitration of any later 
claims.128  A district court in Florida denied a motion to compel arbitration because 
the decedent did not understand the contracts she signed during the admission pro-
cess into a nursing facility.129  The decedent was Vera Gilmore, an 87-year old 
woman with Alzheimer’s-related dementia, confusion, and delusions.130  Ms. Gil-
more signed an agreement to arbitrate included in the admission paperwork upon 
her arrival at a nursing home.131  Given Ms. Gilmore’s “age, physical ailments, his-
tory of dementia, confusion and disorientation, as well as her consistent use of anti-
psychotic medication,” the court held that she lacked the mental capacity to under-
stand the nature and effect of the contracts she signed.132  As a result, the arbitration 
agreement was unenforceable.133 
Like Ms. Gilmore, many nursing home residents suffer from some kind of 
physical or mental impairments that prevent them from actually understanding and 
assenting to the terms of an admission contract or arbitration agreement.134  How-
ever, neither Alzheimer’s nor dementia establishes a presumption of incompe-
tency.135  Rather, “the person with the burden of proof must establish, in light of all 
the surrounding facts and circumstances, that the cognitive impairment or disease 
rendered the contracting party incompetent to engage in the transaction at issue . . . 
                                                          
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 688. 
 126. Brumfield v. Lowe, 744 So. 2d 383, 387 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999). 
 127. Estate of Etting v. Regents Part at Aventura, Inc., 891 So. 2d 558, 558 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
 128. See infra notes 128-132 and accompanying text. 
 129. Gilmore v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., No. 2:10–cv–99–FtM–29DNF, 2010 WL 3944653, at *4 (M.D. 
Fla. Oct. 7, 2010).  The court applied the FAA because the case involved an arbitration agreement con-
tained in the admission contract of a nursing home located in Florida but was owned and operated by a 
Tennessee company, the issue involved commerce “within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. § 2.”  Id. at *2. 
 130. Id. at *1. 
 131. Id.  The decedent’s son had power of attorney for his mother but did not “participate in the intake 
process” at the nursing facility.  Id. 
 132. Id. at *4. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Bagby & Souza, supra note 32, at 189.   See also Kaleb v. Modern Woodmen of Am., 64 P.2d 
605, 607 (Wyo. 1937). 
 135. In re Mildred M.J., 844 N.Y.S.2d 539, 541 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Gala v. Magarinos, 665 
N.Y.S.2d 95, 96 (App. Div. 1997)).  See also Hanks v. McNeil Coal Corp., 168 P.2d 256, 260 (Colo. 
1946) (holding that senile dementia is not conclusive of lack of capacity to contract); Kaleb, 64 P.2d at 
607 (“A condition which may be described by a physician as senile dementia may not be insanity in a 
legal sense.”). 
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.”136  Nevertheless, a resident’s dementia or Alzheimer’s disease may be severe 
enough to render an individual incapable of possessing contractual capacity, espe-
cially if they are “chronic and progressive in nature.”137  Many nursing home resi-
dents suffer from physical or mental limitations, or both, because of old age and 
disease.138  As such, whenever a resident signs a nursing home admission contract 
on his or her own behalf, courts should be aware that lack of capacity is a common 
defense to motions to compel arbitration. 
2. Lack of Authority 
Valid arbitration agreements require assent by competent parties.139  Without 
assent by competent parties in arbitration agreements, “courts have no authority to 
mandate that [parties arbitrate disputes].”140  Parties signing an arbitration agree-
ment are “competent” if they have the authority to do so.141  Additionally, “[a]ssent 
to be bound by the terms of an agreement must be expressed.”142  One way to ex-
press assent to an arbitration provision is through a signature by the parties.143 
However, if a resident lacks mental capacity to enter into a contract144 or is 
otherwise unable to sign the arbitration agreement, a friend, family member, or per-
sonal representative of the resident may sign the agreement on the resident’s be-
half.145  In such circumstances, a common challenge to enforcement of arbitration 
“is that the arbitration agreement should not be enforced because it was not signed 
by the nursing home resident him- or herself, but rather, by a relative or other rep-
resentative.”146 
If the resident does not sign the arbitration agreement, principles of agency and 
contract law may force the resident to arbitrate future claims against the nursing 
home.147  “Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘prin-
cipal’) manifests assent to another person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the 
principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests 
                                                          
 136. Rawlings v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 291, 297 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (foot-
notes omitted). 
 137. See Gaddy v. Douglass, 597 S.E.2d 12, 21 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004). 
 138. Kaleb, 64 P.2d at 607. 
 139. State ex rel. AMFM, LLC v. King, 740 S.E.2d 66, 73 (W. Va. 2013). 
 140. Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 779 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 141. State ex rel. AMFM, LLC, 740 S.E.2d at 73. 
 142. Ally Cat, LLC v. Chauvin, 274 S.W.3d 451, 456 (Ky. 2009). 
 143. See McInnis v. Se. Automatic Sprinkler Co., 233 So. 2d 219, 221 (Miss. 1970) (“The object of a 
signature is to show mutuality or assent . . . .”).  See also Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., 159 Ohio 
App. 3d 66, 72, 2004-Ohio-5757, 823 N.E.2d 19, at ¶ 25 (6th Dist.) (“[B]y signing the agreement, the 
parties agree to arbitrate their disputes and that the parties agree to the terms of the agreement.”). 
 144. See supra notes 103-30 and accompanying text. 
 145. Bagby & Souza, supra note 32, at 189.  See also Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 729 S.E.2d 
217, 226 (W. Va. 2012) (“Many contracts for admission are signed by a . . . family member in a tense 
and bewildering setting.”). 
 146. John R. Schleppenbach, Something Old, Something New: Recent Developments in the Enforcea-
bility of Agreements to Arbitrate Disputes Between Nursing Homes and their Residents, 22 ELDER L.J. 
141, 154 (2014). 
 147. Bouriez v. Carnegie Mellon Univ., 359 F.3d 292, 294 (3d Cir. 2004) (“A party, however, can be 
compelled to arbitrate under an agreement, even if he or she did not sign that agreement, if common law 
principles of agency and contract support such an obligation on his or her part.”); Thomson-CSF, S.A. 
v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Traditional principles of agency law may 
bind a nonsignatory to an arbitration agreement.”). 
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assent or otherwise consents so to act.”148  The party claiming agency must prove 
the existence and scope of the agency relationship.149  Proving an agency relation-
ship exists requires extrinsic evidence because courts typically do not infer an 
agency relationship between family members or whenever one person acts on be-
half of another.150 
In an agency relationship, the agent’s actions legally bind the principal151 only 
if the agent’s actions are within the scope of his or her authority.152  Principals are 
responsible for their agent’s acts and agreements that are within the scope of the 
agent’s authority.153  Statements made by an agent bind the principal if the statement 
falls within the scope of the agent’s authority.154  “Authority is the power of the 
agent to affect the legal relations of the principal by acts done in accordance with 
the principal’s manifestations of consent to him.”155  The resident’s agent must have 
either actual authority, which may be express or implied, or apparent authority to 
sign the arbitration agreement on behalf of the resident.156 
i. Actual Authority 
Actual authority exists “when, at the time of taking action that has legal conse-
quences for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the 
principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to 
act.”157  Actual authority occurs when the principal expressly or implicitly gives an 
agent authority.158 
Evidence of actual authority requires proof that the principal has specifically 
granted the agent the power to bind the principal.159  Proof of actual authority stems 
                                                          
 148. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW. INST. 2006). 
 149. Bluehaven Funding, LLC v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 594 F.3d 1055, 1059 (8th Cir. 2010); Tex. 
Cityview Care Ctr., L.P. v. Fryer, 227 S.W.3d 345, 352 (Tex. App. 2007). 
 150. Wisler v. Manor Care of Lancaster PA, LLC, 2015 PA Super 189, 124 A.3d 317, 323 (Pa. 2015). 
 151. Dickerson v. Longoria, 995 A.2d 721, 735 (Md. 2010). 
 152. Peninsula Land Co. v. Howard, 6 So. 2d 384, 388 (Fla. 1941); see also Stalley v. Transitional 
Hosps. Corp. of Tampa, Inc., 44 So. 3d 627, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (“[T]he scope of the agent’s 
authority is limited to what the principal has authorized the agent to do.”); Bluehaven, 594 F.3d at 1058 
(“A principal is responsible for its agents’ acts and agreements that are within the agent’s authority, 
whether the authority is actual or apparent.”) (quoting Motorsport Mktg., Inc. v. Wiedmaier, Inc., 195 
S.W.3d 492, 498 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006)). 
 153. Nichols v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 851 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). 
 154. P. Flanigan & Sons v. Childs, 248 A.2d 473, 477 (Md. 1968) (“[A] statement made by an agent 
will not bind his principal until an agency is established and then only if the statement is within the scope 
of the agency . . . .”). 
 155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 7 (AM. LAW. INST. 1957). 
 156. AgriStor Leasing v. Farrow, 826 F.2d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 1987) (“An agent whose authority has 
been granted either expressly or by implication possesses actual authority to act on behalf of the princi-
pal.”).  Thomas v. INS, 35 F.3d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[A]ctual authority takes two forms: (1) 
express authority, and (2) authority that is implied or incidental to a grant of express authority.”); Lind 
v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 84 (3d Cir. 1960); (“The term ‘implied authority’ is often seen but 
most authorities consider ‘implied authority’ to be merely a sub-group of ‘actual’ authority.”); Curto v. 
Illini Manors, Inc., 940 N.E.2d 229, 233, 235 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Bates & Still, Jr., supra note 38, at 
283. 
 157. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (2006). 
 158. Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 85 (3d Cir. 1960). 
 159. See U.S. v. Schaltenbrand, 930 F.2d 1554, 1560-61 (11th Cir. 1991). 
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from “the principal’s manifestations to the agent.”160  It is the principal’s words or 
conduct, not the agent’s, which establish actual authority.161  Also, the principal’s 
knowing acquiescence to the agent’s actions may establish actual authority.162 
However, a mere familial relationship between the resident and the signor does 
not create an agency relationship.163  Absent extrinsic evidence, “a spouse or other 
family member [does] not have actual authority to sign an arbitration agreement on 
the resident’s behalf.”164 
There are two kinds of actual authority: express and implied.  The first kind of 
actual authority is express authority.165  Express authority exists “when the principal 
explicitly tells the agent what to do.”166  The principal’s conduct or words, written 
or spoken, creates express authority.167  The scope of express authority “extends 
only to the powers the principal confers upon the agent.”168 
A written contract, power of attorney,169 or court-ordered guardianship170 may 
establish express authority.  “Powers of attorney are strictly construed.”171  As such, 
powers of attorneys grant only the explicit powers specified that the principal in-
tended to convey.172  In other words, “an agent’s authority under a power of attorney 
is to be construed with reference to the types of transaction expressly authorized in 
the document and subject always to the agent’s duty to act with the ‘utmost good 
faith.’”173 
Additionally, a “durable power of attorney constitutes a grant of express au-
thority per its terms.”174  A durable power of attorney creates an agency relationship 
                                                          
 160. Nichols v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 851 S.W.2d 657, 661-62 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); see also 
AgriStor, 826 F.2d at 737 (“A determination of an express or implied agency focuses on communications 
and contacts between the principal and the agent.”). 
 161. Opp v. Wheaton Van Lines, Inc., 231 F.3d 1060, 1064 (7th Cir. 2000).  See also Schaffart v. 
ONEOK, Inc., 686 F.3d 461, 471 (8th Cir. 2012) (“Whether express or implied, actual authority requires 
action by the principal.”). 
 162. Essco Geometric v. Harvard Indus., 46 F.3d 718, 723 (8th Cir. 1995); Anderson v. Gen. Cas., 935 
A.2d 746, 752 (Md. 2007). 
 163. Wisler v. Manor Care of Lancaster PA, LLC, 2015 PA Super 189, 124 A.3d 317, 323 (Pa. 2015) 
(“Agency cannot be inferred from mere relationships or family ties, and we do not assume agency merely 
because one person acts on behalf of another.”). 
 164. Curto v. Illini Manors, Inc., 940 N.E.2d 229, 234 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). 
 165. See Nichols v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 851 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (“Actual 
authority may be express or implied.”). 
 166. Id. at 661; Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. Am. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 376 F.3d 664, 672 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 167. Harris v. Ark. State Highway & Transp. Dep’t, 437 F.3d 749, 751 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Turner 
v. Burlington N. R. Co., 771 F.2d 341, 345 (8th Cir. 1985)). 
 168. Curto. 940 N.E.2d at 233. 
 169. Moffett v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., 187 P.3d 1140, 1144 (Colo. App. 2008) (“[T]he execution of a 
power of attorney creates a principal-agent relationship.”), aff’d, 219 P.3d 1068 (Colo. 2009); Matter of 
Trust of Franzen, 955 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Colo. 1998) (“A power of attorney is an instrument by which a 
principal confers express authority on an agent to perform certain acts or kinds of acts on the principal’s 
behalf.”); Ping v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 591 (Ky. 2012) (“A power of attorney is a 
written, often formally acknowledged, manifestation of the principal’s intent to enter into such a rela-
tionship with a designated agent.”). 
 170. Curto. 940 N.E.2d at 233; see also Bates & Still, Jr., supra note 38, at 283 (“A resident may grant 
express or actual authority to act on his or her behalf pursuant to verbal express authority, power of 
attorney (“POA”), durable power of attorney (“DPOA”), or court appointment as guardian or conservator 
for the resident.”). 
 171. Kotsch v. Kotsch, 608 So. 2d 879, 880 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Ping, 376 S.W.3d at 592. 
 174. Wisler v. Manor Care of Lancaster PA, LLC, 124 A.3d 317, 323-24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015).  
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“that would continue beyond the principal’s incapacity.”175  Every state has adopted 
legislation allowing for durable powers of attorney.176 
However, power of attorney to make medical or health care decisions grants 
authority to admit principals into a nursing home but not authority to sign an arbi-
tration agreement on the principal’s behalf.177  For example, “the intermediate ap-
pellate courts in Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Texas have concluded that the au-
thority to make health care decisions on another’s behalf does not constitute author-
ity to sign an arbitration agreement on that person’s behalf.”178 
In addition, other courts “have recently concluded that the decision to sign an 
arbitration agreement was not a health care decision, and they based that decision 
on the fact that signing the arbitration agreement was not a prerequisite to admission 
to a health care facility.”179  Specifically, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that 
a nursing home could not compel arbitration against the daughter of a resident, in-
dividually or as personal representative of resident’s estate, because “signing the 
arbitration provision was not a part of the consideration necessary for . . . admission 
to [the nursing home],” and because the daughter “did not have the authority . . . to 
enter into the arbitration provision contained within the admissions agreement.”180 
Moreover, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a nursing home resident’s 
son had actual authority “to sign the required admission papers.”181  However, the 
son did not have actual authority to sign an arbitration agreement “that would waive 
[the resident’s] right of access to the courts and to trial by jury” because the arbitra-
tion agreement “was optional and was not required for [the resident] to remain at 
the facility.”182 
In another case, a Maryland court refused to enforce an arbitration agreement 
signed by an agent of the resident; even though the signor of the admission agree-
ment was the resident’s agent for purposes of making financial and health care de-
cisions.  The court held that the scope of that agency relationship did not include 
the authority to bind the principal to the arbitration agreement.183 
                                                          
 175. Ping, 376 S.W.3d at 591. 
 176. Linda S. Whitton, Durable Powers as an Alternative to Guardianship: Lessons We Have Learned, 
37 STETSON L. REV. 7 (2007). 
 177. See Dickerson v. Longoria, 995 A.2d 721, 736-38 (Md. 2010).  See also Curto v. Illini Manors, 
Inc., 940 N.E.2d 229, 233 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (“[A] health care power of attorney granted for medical 
decisions does not confer authority to sign an arbitration agreement waiving legal rights.”); Life Care 
Ctrs. of Am. v. Smith, 681 S.E.2d 182 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (power of attorney granted to daughter for 
medical decisions did not grant authority to waive legal rights under arbitration agreement); Lujan v. 
Life Care Ctrs. of Am., 222 P.3d 970, 973-76 (Colo. App. 2009) (agreeing with other jurisdictions that 
have concluded that “a health care proxy’s decision to agree to arbitrate is [not] a medical treatment 
decision”); Tex. Cityview Care Ctr., L.P. v. Fryer, 227 S.W.3d 345, 352-53 (Tex. App. 2007) 
(“[N]othing in the medical power of attorney indicates that it was intended to confer authority . . . to 
make legal, as opposed to health care, decisions . . . such as whether to waive [the] right to a jury trial 
by agreeing to arbitration of any disputes.”); Blankfeld v. Richmond Health Care, Inc., 902 So. 2d 296, 
301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (“There is nothing in the [health care proxy] statute to indicate legislative 
intent that such a proxy can enter into contracts which agree to things not strictly related to health care 
decisions. In our opinion, a proxy is not authorized to waive the right to trial by jury. . . .”). 
 178. Dickerson v. Longoria, 995 A.2d 721, 737 (Md. 2010).  See supra note 172 and accompanying 
text. 
 179. Dickerson, 995 A.2d at 738. 
 180. Miss. Care Ctr. of Greenville, LLC v. Hinyub, 975 So. 2d 211, 218 (Miss. 2008). 
 181. Koricic v. Beverly Enters.—Neb., Inc., 773 N.W.2d 145, 151 (Neb. 2009). 
 182. Id.; Forest Hill Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. McFarlan, 995 So. 2d 775, 786-87 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). 
 183. Dickerson, 995 A.2d at 735. 
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In contrast, an appellate court in New Mexico held that the granddaughter of a 
nursing home resident had actual and apparent authority to complete the admission 
paperwork on the resident’s behalf.  The court stated that the granddaughter had the 
authority to sign the optional arbitration agreement contained in the admission pa-
perwork because the arbitration agreement was “considered an admission document 
and that accepting or rejecting arbitration [was] part of the admission process.”184 
On the other hand, several courts have held that a health-care power of attorney 
includes the authority to enter into an arbitration agreement.  The Tennessee Su-
preme Court held that “an attorney-in-fact acting pursuant to a durable power of 
attorney for health care may sign a nursing-home contract that contains an arbitra-
tion provision because this action is necessary to ‘consent to health care.’”185  Sim-
ilarly, a Georgia appellate court found a valid and enforceable arbitration provision 
in a nursing home admission contract signed by the resident’s son who had express 
authority to act on his father’s behalf because of a general power of attorney.186 
The second kind of actual authority is implied authority, or “actual authority 
circumstantially proved.”187  Implied authority exists when the principal’s conduct, 
reasonably interpreted, leads the agent to believe that the principal wants the agent 
to act on his or her behalf.188  Implied authority is authority “intended by the prin-
cipal, or would be if the principal thought about it.”189  It comes from “powers in-
cidental and necessary to carry out the express authority.”190  Implied authority in-
cludes authority “either to (1) do what is necessary to accomplish the agent’s ex-
press responsibilities or (2) act in a manner that the agent reasonably believes the 
principal wishes the agent to act, in light of the principal’s objectives and manifes-
tations.”191 
Proof of implied authority may come “from the circumstances of a case based 
on prior course of dealing of a similar nature between the alleged agent and princi-
pal or from a previous agency relationship.”192  Additionally, implied authority may 
be proven by the facts and circumstances of a particular case, as well as both parties’ 
words and conduct.193  An Illinois court found no evidence of implied authority to 
bind the resident when the agent signed the arbitration agreement in the admissions 
contract because the resident was absent when the agent signed the arbitration 
agreement and did not direct the agent to sign the agreement as the resident’s rep-
resentative.194  Additionally, there was no evidence that the resident knew that the 
                                                          
 184. Barron v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 265 P.3d 720, 726 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011). 
 185. Owens v. Nat’l Health Corp., 263 S.W.3d 876, 884 (Tenn. 2007) (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 
34-6-201(3) (West 2015)). 
 186. Triad Health Mgmt. of Ga., III, LLC v. Johnson, 679 S.E.2d 785, 789 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (power 
of attorney gave resident’s son “full power and authority to do and perform all and every act . . . neces-
sary, requisite or proper to be done, as fully . . . as I might or could do if personally present,” without 
specific limitations). 
 187. Curto v. Illini Manors, Inc., 940 N.E.2d 229, 233 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). 
 188. Id.; Forest Hill Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. McFarlan, 995 So. 2d 775, 781 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). 
 189. Thomas v. INS, 35 F.3d 1332, 1339 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 190. Nichols v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 851 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Essco Geometric 
v. Harvard Indus., 46 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 191. Koricic v. Beverly Enters.—Neb., Inc., 773 N.W.2d 145, 150 (Neb. 2009). 
 192. Curto v. Illini Manors, Inc., 940 N.E.2d 229, 233 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).  See also Essco, 46 F.3d at 
724 (“Missouri case law suggests that custom and the relations of the parties establish the parameters of 
implied actual authority.”). 
 193. Forest Hill Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. McFarlan, 995 So. 2d 775, 781 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008). 
 194. Curto, 940 N.E.2d at 233. 
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agent signed the arbitration agreement and agreed to or adopted her signature as his 
own.195 
ii. Apparent Authority 
Absent actual authority, an agent can bind a principal if the agent has apparent 
authority.196  Apparent authority “is the power held by an agent or other actor to 
affect a principal’s legal relations with third parties when a third party reasonably 
believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is 
traceable to the principal’s manifestations.”197  Apparent authority exists when the 
principal’s actions “convey the impression to a third party that an agent has certain 
powers which he may or may not actually possess.”198  Apparent authority is au-
thority that “has been knowingly permitted by the principal or which the principal 
holds the agent out as possessing.”199 
To establish apparent authority, there must be “evidence that a principal has 
communicated directly with the third party or has knowingly permitted its agent to 
exercise authority.”200  It exists when “certain acts or manifestations by the alleged 
principal to a third party lead[] the third party to believe that an agent had authority 
to act.”201  The three-pronged test for recovery under apparent authority “requires a 
showing of (1) acts or conduct of the principal indicating the agent’s authority, (2) 
reasonable reliance upon those acts by a third person, and (3) a detrimental change 
in position by the third person as a result of that reliance.”202  “[D]irect communi-
cation from the principal to a third party causing that third party to reasonably be-
lieve that a person has authority to act for the principal” creates apparent author-
ity.203  The communication can be nonverbal, such as through “a combination of 
actions by the principal, or manifestations that the principal allows to be made with-
out objection.204  Finally, there must be proof that the apparent agent acted within 
the scope of his or her authority, since “an apparent principal is bound by an appar-
ent agent’s acts only if that agent is acting within the scope of his apparent author-
ity.”205 
A New Mexico court found an agent had apparent authority to bind a principal 
to an arbitration agreement.206  In that case, a nursing home resident, gave her grand-
daughter permission to complete admission paperwork on her behalf, including an 
arbitration agreement.207  The court looked to the reasonableness of the nursing 
home’s reliance on the granddaughter’s representation of authority in considering 
                                                          
 195. Id. 
 196. Dickerson v. Longoria, 995 A.2d 721, 735 (Md. 2010). 
 197. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). 
 198. Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 85 (3d Cir. 1960). 
 199. Agristor Leasing v. Farrow, 826 F.2d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 1987). 
 200. Nichols v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 851 S.W.2d 657, 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). 
 201. Klein v. Weiss, 395 A.2d 126, 140 (Md. 1978). 
 202. Eaton v. Porter, 645 So. 2d 1323, 1325 (Miss. 1994); see also Alexander v. Chandler, 179 S.W.3d 
385, 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (“The three elements required to make a prima facie showing of apparent 
authority stated above can be reduced to: (1) consent by the principal to the exercise of the authority; (2) 
good faith reliance by a third party; and (3) damage sustained.”). 
 203. Alexander, 179 S.W.3d at 388. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Gentry v. Beverly Enters.-Ga., Inc., 714 F. Supp. 2d 1225, 1230 (S.D. Ga. 2009). 
 206. Barron v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 265 P.3d 720, 726 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011). 
 207. Id. at 722. 
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the scope of the granddaughter’s apparent authority.208  The court concluded that 
the granddaughter had apparent authority to bind the grandmother to the arbitration 
provision because the grandmother had communicated the granddaughter’s author-
ity to the social services director who handled admissions.209 
An Alabama court took a more relaxed approach to apparent authority, finding 
apparent authority “where the principal passively permits the agent to appear to a 
third person to have the authority to act on [her] behalf.”210  The brother of a resident 
signed the admission contract and arbitration agreement on his sister’s behalf as an 
“authorized representative.”211  Although the power of attorney did not exist when 
the brother signed the arbitration provision, the court still found a valid arbitration 
agreement existed because there was “no evidence indicating that [the resident] had 
any objection to [her brother’s] acting on her behalf in admitting [the resident] to 
the nursing home.  On the contrary, the evidence suggests that [the resident] ap-
proved of her brother’s acting on her behalf.”212  In fact, a few weeks into the resi-
dent’s stay at the nursing home, she executed a power of attorney, giving her brother 
authority to act on her behalf.213 
On the other hand, a Texas court found that a nursing home resident’s wife 
lacked apparent authority to sign an arbitration agreement on the resident’s be-
half.214  The court noted the lack of evidence that the resident acted “to induce the 
belief that [his wife] was his agent. In fact, there is no evidence he was even present 
when the form was signed.”215  The court found that the nursing home resident was 
not bound by the arbitration agreement because the wife lacked apparent authority 
to sign on her husband’s behalf, rendering the agreement invalid.216 
Similarly, a California court found that two daughters who signed an arbitration 
agreement on behalf of their comatose and mentally incompetent mother lacked 
apparent authority to bind their mother to the agreement.217  The court reasoned that 
even though the daughters signed the agreement, there was no apparent authority 
because there was no “evidence [that the] comatose and mentally incompetent 
woman did anything which caused [the nursing home] to believe either of her 
daughters was authorized to act as her agent in any capacity.”218  Importantly, the 
court noted that “[a] person cannot become the agent of another merely by repre-
senting herself as such.”219  Rather, agency requires the principal to cause a third 
party to believe someone was his or her agent, even if the principal does not employ 
the agent expressly.220 
Generally, most courts reject apparent authority theories to bind signors of ar-
bitration agreements in nursing home admission contracts.221  Courts in California, 
Texas, Mississippi, and Georgia have all refused to find to apparent authority even 
                                                          
 208. Id. at 725. 
 209. Id. at 726.  See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
 210. Treadwell Ford, Inc. v. Courtesy Auto Brokers, Inc., 426 So. 2d 859, 861 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983). 
 211. Carraway v. Beverly Enters. Ala., Inc., 978 So. 2d 27, 30 (Ala. 2007). 
 212. Id. at 31. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Sikes v. Heritage Oaks W. Ret. Vill., 238 S.W.3d 807, 810 (Tex. App. 2007). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Pagarigan v. Libby Care Ctr., Inc. 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892, 894-96 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
 218. Id. at 895. 
 219. Id. at 894. 
 220. Id. 
 221. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text. 
20
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2016, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2016/iss2/10
No. 2] Seeking Justice for Grandma 489 
when the signor was a relative of the resident.222  When attempting to dispute the 
validity or enforceability of an arbitration agreement in a nursing home contract, a 
claim of apparent authority may be easily refuted by the evidence and requires an 
intense investigation of the facts.223 
1. Third-Party Beneficiary 
Third-party beneficiary theory is an exception to the general rule of contract 
law that only parties (signatories) to a contract are bound by or may enforce its 
provisions.224  Nonsignatories are bound by an arbitration agreement in a contract 
if they are third-party beneficiaries.225  A third-party beneficiary is someone that the 
parties to the contract intended to benefit.226  If performance of the contract directly 
results in a benefit to a nonsignatory and such benefit was “within the contemplation 
of the parties as shown by its terms,” the nonsignatory is a third-party beneficiary.227  
Thus, the intent of the parties at the time of contract execution and the terms of the 
contract determine if a third-party beneficiary exists.228  Specifically, the contract 
must evince “the express or implied intention to benefit the party, [and also] an 
intention to benefit the party directly.”229  However, if the contract terms lack an 
express statement of the intent to benefit a third party, “there is a strong presumption 
that the third party is not a beneficiary and that the parties contracted to benefit only 
                                                          
 222. See, e.g., Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC v. Barber, 2005-CA-02199-COA (¶ 13) (Miss. Ct. App. 
2007) (noting that even though nursing home resident’s son acted as if he had the authority to bind his 
mother, the principal’s acts or conduct must prove the agent’s authority); Ashburn Health Care Ctr., Inc. 
v. Poole, 648 S.E.2d 430, 432-33 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that the nursing home resident did not 
authorize her husband to act as her agent when he signed the arbitration agreement in an admission 
contract because the resident’s son had durable power of attorney for his mother but he did not sign the 
agreement, despite being present during the signing); Tex. Cityview Care Ctr., L.P. v. Fryer, 227 S.W.3d 
345, 353-54 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that what matters is the actions of the principal, not the agent, 
and that the principal was not even present when her daughter signed the admissions agreement). 
 223. Bagby & Souza, supra note 32, at 190. 
 224. Ping v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 595 (Ky. 2012).  “For a third-party beneficiary to 
exist, there must first exist a valid contract executed by one with ‘legal capacity’ to enter the contract.”  
Adams Cmty. Care Ctr., LLC v. Reed, 2009-CA-00730-SCT (¶ 16) (Miss. 2010). 
 225. Grenada Living Ctr., LLC v. Coleman, 2006–CA–00169–SCT (¶ 16) (Miss. 2007); Alterra 
Healthcare Corp. v. Estate of Linton ex rel. Graham, 953 So. 2d 574, 579 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 226. Dickerson v. Longoria, 995 A.2d 721, 741-42 (Md. 2010) (quoting Shillman v. Hobstetter, 241 
A.2d 570, 575 (Md. 1968) (“An individual is a third-party beneficiary to a contract if ‘the contract was 
intended for his [or her] benefit’ and ‘it . . . clearly appear[s] that the parties intended to recognize him 
[or her] as the primary party in interest and as privy to the promise.’”)). 
 227. Burns v. Wash. Sav., 171 So. 2d 322, 325 (Miss. 1965).  The promisee must have a duty or legal 
obligation to the third party that connects the third party to the contract.  Id. 
 228. Burns v. Wash. Sav., 171 So. 2d 322, 325 (Miss. 1965). 
 229. Glass v. United States, 258 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2001).  See JP Morgan Chase & Co. v. 
Conegie ex rel. Lee, 492 F.3d 596, 600 (5th Cir. 2007).  See also McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 362 
(1st Cir. 1994) (citation omitted) (“Because third-party beneficiary status constitutes an exception to the 
general rule that a contract does not grant enforceable rights to nonsignatories, a person aspiring to such 
status must show with special clarity that the contracting parties intended to confer a benefit on him.”); 
Nitro Distrib., Inc. v. Dunn, 194 S.W.3d 339, 345 (Mo. 2006), as modified on denial of reh’g (June 30, 
2006) (“To be bound as a third-party beneficiary, the terms of the contract must clearly express intent to 
benefit that party or an identifiable class of which the party is a member.”). 
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themselves.”230  An incidental benefit to a third party does not create a third-party 
beneficiary.231 
If the resident does not sign the arbitration agreement, states differ in determin-
ing whether the resident is an intended third-party beneficiary.  For example, when 
a nursing home resident’s wife signed an arbitration agreement in representative 
capacity, a Pennsylvania court held that the “resident could not be an intended third-
party beneficiary to a contract to which he was ostensibly a party.”232  Similarly, the 
District Court of New Mexico noted that a nursing home resident was not a third-
party beneficiary of the arbitration provision.233  Although the resident was a third-
party beneficiary of the admission contract, the court reasoned that the resident’s 
“consent to arbitrate was not required for admission,” and the arbitration agreement 
was not intended to benefit the resident.”234 
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a nursing home resident 
was bound by an arbitration provision in a nursing home admission contract as non-
signatory third-party beneficiary of agreement.235  Although the resident’s mother 
signed the contract on the resident’s behalf, the contract intended to benefit the res-
ident since it named him “as the resident receiving care and services from the nurs-
ing home.”236  As a result, the court found that contract expresses clearly the parties’ 
intent to make the resident a beneficiary of the contract.237 
Moreover, courts are split regarding the binding effect of arbitration provisions 
on the resident’s wrongful-death heirs or representatives.238  In states where the 
wrongful death statute “is wholly derivative of and dependent on” claims that the 
decedent could have brought,239 courts are more likely to consider the wrongful 
death plaintiffs – the decedent’s heirs – as third-party beneficiaries bound by the 
arbitration provision in the contract.240  For instance, the Alabama Supreme Court 
                                                          
 230. Nitro Distrib., Inc., 194 S.W.3d at 345. 
 231. Id.  See also E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, 
S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Thus, if it was not the promisee’s intention to confer direct 
benefits upon a third party, but rather such third party happens to benefit from the performance of the 
promise either coincidentally or indirectly, then the third party will have no enforceable rights under the 
contract.”). 
 232. Washburn v. N. Health Facilities, Inc., 2015 PA Super 168, 121 A.3d 1008, 1016. 
 233. Barker v. Evangelical Lutheran Good Samaritan Soc’y, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1268-69 (D.N.M. 
2010). 
 234. Id. at 1269. 
 235. JP Morgan Chase & Co. v. Conegie ex rel. Lee, 492 F.3d 596, 600 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. THI of N.M. at Hobbs Ctr., LLC v. Spradlin, 532 F. App’x 813, 817-18 (10th Cir. 2013); Scheller, 
supra note 91, at 546. 
 239. Bybee v. Abdulla, 2008 UT 35, ¶ 23, 189 P.3d 40. 
 240. Spradlin, 532 F. App’x at 817 (quoting Trinity Mission of Clinton, LLC v. Barber, 2005–CA–
02199–COA (¶ 27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2007)) (“We conclude that in New Mexico, a wrongful-death claim 
derives directly from the claim possessed by the decedent, had he or she lived.  . . . a ‘wrongful-death 
suit is a derivative action by the beneficiaries, and those beneficiaries, therefore, stand in the position of 
their decedent.’”); Laizure v. Avante at Leesburg, Inc., 109 So. 3d 752, 761–62 (Fla. 2013) (“[T]he 
nature of a wrongful death cause of action in Florida is derivative in the context of determining whether 
a decedent’s estate and heirs are bound by the decedent’s agreement to arbitrate. The estate and heirs 
stand in the shoes of the decedent for purposes of whether the defendant is liable and are bound by the 
decedent’s actions and contracts with respect to defenses and releases.”); In re Labatt Food Serv., LP, 
279 S.W.3d 640, 646 (Tex. 2009) (“[R]egardless of the fact that [decedent’s] beneficiaries are seeking 
compensation for their own personal loss, they still stand in [decedent’s] legal shoes and are bound by 
his agreement.”); Barber, 2005–CA–02199–COA (¶ 27) (“Because Ms. Barber’s claims would have 
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held that personal representatives (an executor and an administratrix) of nursing 
home residents’ estates were bound by the arbitration agreement entered into by the 
decedent.241  An executor and administratix have all the same powers and limita-
tions of the decedent, so by bringing wrongful death claims on behalf of the dece-
dents, they were bound by the arbitration provisions contained in the admission 
contract just as the decedents would have been.242 
When the wrongful death cause of action is new or independent from any 
causes of action that the decedent could bring, courts are more likely to hold that 
heirs to the decedent’s estate are not third-party beneficiaries and therefore are not 
bound to the arbitration agreement.243  For example, the Utah Supreme Court held 
that “a decedent does not have the power to contract away the wrongful death action 
of his heirs.”244  In Utah, “a wrongful death cause of action, while derivative in the 
sense that it will not lie without a viable underlying personal injury claim, is a sep-
arate claim.”245  Since the wrongful death plaintiff was not an intended beneficiary 
of the admission contract, she was not a third-party beneficiary and could not be 
bound by the arbitration agreement.246 
Similarly, in a Pennsylvania case, a resident’s contractual agreement with a 
nursing home to arbitrate all claims was not binding on the nonsignatory wrongful 
death claimants because the wrongful death cause of action was an independent 
                                                          
been subject to arbitration, the claims of her wrongful death beneficiaries are likewise subject the arbi-
tration provision.”); Ballard v. Sw. Detroit Hosp., 327 N.W.2d 370, 371–72 (Mich. 1982) (“[A]lthough 
the Michigan wrongful death act provides for additional damages benefitting the decedent’s next of kin 
for loss of society and companionship, it does not create a separate cause of action independent of the 
underlying rights of the decedent. Rather, the cause of action is expressly made derivative of the dece-
dent’s rights.”). 
 241. Briarcliff Nursing Home, Inc. v. Turcotte, 894 So. 2d 661, 665 (Ala. 2004). 
 242. Id. at 664-65. 
 243. Estate of Decamacho ex rel. Guthrie v. La Solana Care & Rehab, Inc., 316 P.3d 607, 614 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2014) (“[A] wrongful death claim is independently held by the decedent’s statutory beneficiar-
ies.  . . . [T]he wrongful death claim . . . is not subject to the terms of the admission agreement’s arbitra-
tion clause.”); Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co., LLC, 2012 IL 113204, ¶ 57 (citation omitted) (“[A] 
wrongful-death action does not accrue until death and is not brought for the benefit of the decedent’s 
estate, but for the next of kin who are the true parties in interest. Plaintiff, as [decedent’s] personal rep-
resentative in the wrongful-death action, is merely a nominal party, effectively filing suit as a statutory 
trustee on behalf of the next of kin. Plaintiff is not prosecuting the wrongful-death claim on behalf of 
[decedent], and thus plaintiff is not bound by [decedent’s] agreement to arbitrate for purposes of this 
cause of action.”); Ping v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 376 S.W.3d 581, 599 (Ky. 2012) (“Because under our 
law the wrongful death claim is not derived through or on behalf of the resident, but accrues separately 
to the wrongful death beneficiaries and is meant to compensate them for their own pecuniary loss, we 
agree with the Courts cited above which have held that a decedent cannot bind his or her beneficiaries 
to arbitrate their wrongful death claim.”); Lawrence v. Beverly Manor, 273 S.W.3d 525, 529 (Mo. 2009) 
(“[Decedent] could not be a party to the wrongful death suit resulting from her death. A claim for wrong-
ful death is not derivative from any claims [the decedent] might have had, and the damages are not 
awarded to the wrongful death plaintiffs on [the decedent’s] behalf. . . . [Decedent’s son], as the plaintiff 
in the wrongful death action, is not bound by the arbitration agreement signed by [decedent].”); Peters 
v. Columbus Steel Castings Co., 115 Ohio St.3d 134, 2007-Ohio-4787, 873 N.E.2d 1258, at ¶ 19 (“Thus, 
a decedent cannot bind his or her beneficiaries to arbitrate their wrongful-death claims.”).  But see Allen 
v. Pacheco, 71 P.3d 375, 379 (Colo. 2003) (applying arbitration agreement to wrongful death plaintiffs 
by looking at the contracting parties’ intent and the terms of the contract even though “a wrongful death 
claim is separate and distinct from a cause of action the deceased could have maintained had he sur-
vived.”). 
 244. Bybee v. Abdulla, 2008 UT 35, ¶ 40, 189 P.3d 40. 
 245. Id. at ¶ 23. 
 246. Id. at ¶¶ 36-37. 
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action.247  The court noted that “wrongful death actions are derivative of decedents’ 
injuries but are not derivative of decedents’ rights.”248  Finally, an Oklahoma court 
also “held that a decedent cannot bind the beneficiaries to arbitrate their wrongful 
death claim.”249  The state’s wrongful death statute created a “new cause of action” 
that allows the surviving spouse, children, or next of kin of the decedent to seek 
compensation for their losses.250  As such, the Oklahoma court found no error in the 
trial court’s decision to deny the nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration of the 
wrongful death claim.251 
One person signing an arbitration agreement cannot typically bind another per-
son unless they are that person’s agent.  However, the nursing home context com-
plicates the issue because arbitration agreements in admission contracts are signed 
by individuals acting on the resident’s behalf or the now deceased resident.  Addi-
tionally, many parties disputing motions to compel arbitration are nonsignatories to 
the original contract, either the resident who had an agent sign on his or her behalf 
or the deceased resident’s estate or heir.  Since courts across the country vary in 
their approaches, it is hard to predict whether a court will find a third-party benefi-
ciary.  In the end, the terms of the contract, the intent of the contracting parties, the 
signor of the contract, the party bringing the claim against the nursing home, and 
whether the arbitration provision is contained within the admission contract will 
affect whether a court will find someone a third-party beneficiary.  For wrongful 
death claims, the outcome will largely depend on the court’s interpretation of the 
state’s wrongful death statute. 
2. Unconscionability 
The FAA allows a court to apply state laws “if that law arose to govern issues 
concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.”252  
Thus, “traditional state law defenses to contract formation such as unconscionabil-
ity”253 can invalidate arbitration agreements without violating section 2 of the 
FAA.254 
Unconscionability is a defense to contract formation “which serves to relieve a 
party from an unfair contract or from an unfair portion of a contract.”255  Uncon-
scionability can invalidate contracts when there is an “absence of meaningful choice 
on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably 
favorable to the other party.”256  However, absence of meaningful choice is not de-
terminative of unconscionability, especially if there is grossly unequal bargaining 
                                                          
 247. Pisano v. Extendicare Homes, Inc., 2013 PA Super 232, 77 A.3d 651, 663. 
 248. Id. at 660. See also N. Health Facilities v. Batz, 993 F. Supp. 2d 485, 496 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (“[A] 
review of Pennsylvania Supreme Court case law discloses that, over the past half century, it has consist-
ently treated wrongful death claims as independent claims derived from the rights of a different plaintiff 
than the decedent.”). 
 249. Boler v. Sec. Health Care, L.L.C., 2014 OK 80, ¶ 26, 336 P.3d 468, 477. 
 250. Id. at ¶ 27. 
 251. Id. at ¶¶ 26-27. 
 252. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987).  The court went on to state that state laws that 
derive meaning from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue does not comply with §2 of the FAA.  
Id. 
 253. Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 488-89 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 254. Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). 
 255. Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 145 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985). 
 256. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
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power.257  Yet inequality in bargaining power, in and of itself, will usually not in-
validate a contract.258  Rather, the defense of unconscionability is meant to prevent 
sophisticated parties with more bargaining power from taking advantage of less so-
phisticated parties.259 
Unconscionability “guard[s] against one-sided contracts, oppression and unfair 
surprise.”260  Unconscionability is “linked inextricably with the process of contract 
formation” even though “[o]ppression and unfair surprise can occur during the bar-
gaining process or  . . . become evidence later, when a dispute or other circum-
stances invoke the objectively unreasonable terms.”261  All of the circumstances 
surrounding contract formation, including the setting, purpose, and the effect of a 
contract, help determine whether it is unconscionable.262 
Courts typically “look at both the procedural and substantive aspects of a con-
tract to determine whether, considered together, they make the agreement or provi-
sion in question unconscionable.”263  In general, unconscionability has two ele-
ments: “procedural unconscionability, i.e., the formalities of making the contract, 
and substantive unconscionability, i.e., the terms set forth in the contract.”264  The 
procedural component involves the circumstances surrounding the entering of the 
contract; thus, the court focuses on whether the parties had a reasonable opportunity 
to understand the terms of the contract and had a meaningful choice in accepting 
it.265 
One critical question to ask regarding unconscionability is whether “each party 
to the contract, considering his obvious education or lack of it, have a reasonable 
opportunity to understand the terms of the contract, or were the important terms 
hidden in a maze of fine print and minimized by deceptive sales practices?”266  Un-
conscionability is critical defense to contract formation because “when a party of 
little bargaining power, and hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreason-
able contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his 
consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the 
terms.”267  In that case, “the court should consider whether the terms of the contract 
are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld.”268 
The unique nature of nursing home admission contracts, and the arbitration 
agreements contained therein, places them at more of a risk of unconscionability.  
For example, in Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., the Ohio Court of Appeals found 
an arbitration clause unconscionable when signed by the spouse of a nursing home 
                                                          
 257. See id. (“In many cases the meaningfulness of the choice is negated by a gross inequality of bar-
gaining power.”). 
 258. Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 259. United States v. Martinez, 151 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 260. Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 492-93 (Mo. 2012) (en banc). 
 261. Id. at 493. 
 262. Miller v. Cotter, 863 N.E.2d 537, 545 (Mass. 2007); Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d at 
449. 
 263. Eaton v. CMH Homes, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 426, 433 (Mo. 2015).  See Prieto v. Healthcare & Ret. 
Corp. of Am., 919 So. 2d 531, 532-33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
 264. Torres v. Simpatico, Inc., 781 F.3d 963, 968 (8th Cir. 2015).  Accord AT&T Mobility LLC v. 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 340 (2011); State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Mo. 
2006). 
 265. Prieto, 919 So. 2d at 533. 
 266. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d at 449. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. at 450. 
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admittee because the spouse “at the time she signed the document, was concerned 
about the immediate health of her husband and was in no position to review and 
fully appreciate the terms of the agreement.”269  Mrs. Small’s experience is common 
among family members and the elderly who sign contracts upon admission into a 
nursing home under similar conditions.270 
In most cases, a contract must be both procedurally and substantively uncon-
scionable to be invalid.271  Procedural and substantive unconscionability guard 
against “one-sided contracts, oppression and unfair surprise.”272 
i. Procedural Unconscionability 
Procedural unconscionability deals with the process and circumstances sur-
rounding contract formation and the form of the contract.273  The existence of “in-
equities, improprieties, or unfairness in the bargaining process and formation of the 
contract” evidence procedural unconscionability.274  Inadequacies regarding the 
age, sophistication, or knowledge of a party may result in a lack of voluntary con-
sent or a lack of knowledge opportunity to understand or negotiate contract terms 
support a finding of procedural unconscionability.275 
Procedural unconscionability also exists when there is unfair surprise.276  Un-
fair surprise “involves the extent to which the supposedly agreed-upon terms are 
hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce them.”277  
The use of fine print and convoluted or unduly complex language can cause unfair 
surprise.278 
Procedural unconscionability often stems from contracts of adhesion.279  A con-
tract of adhesion is a contract drafted by a party of superior bargaining power and 
imposed on a weaker party who must accept or reject the contract as it is rather than 
                                                          
 269. Small v. HCF of Perrysburg, Inc., 159 Ohio App. 3d 66, 72, 2004-Ohio-5757, 823 N.E.2d 19, at 
¶ 9 (6th Dist.). 
 270. See supra notes 22-29 and accompanying text. 
 271. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 340 (2011) (stating that unconscionability 
requires both a procedural and substantive element); Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 729 S.E.2d 
217, 227 (W. Va. 2012); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F.3d 1198, 1199 (9th Cir. 2002).  Tra-
ditionally, Missouri courts “viewed unconscionability in the context of procedural unconscionability, 
i.e., the formalities of making the contract, and substantive unconscionability, i.e., the terms set forth in 
the contract.”  Torres v. Simpatico, Inc., 781 F.3d 963, 968-69 (8th Cir. 2015).  However, Missouri 
courts now “shall limit review of the defense of unconscionability to the context of its relevance to 
contract formation.” Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 492 n.3 (Mo. 2012). 
 272. Brewer, 364 S.W.3d at 492-93. 
 273. See Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999); Repair Masters Constr., 
Inc. v. Gary, 277 S.W.3d 854, 857 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Romano ex rel. Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 
861 So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Gainsville Health Care Ctr. v. Weston, 857 So. 2d 278, 284 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Vicksburg Partners, L.P. v. Stephens, 911 So. 2d 507, 517 (Miss. 2005) over-
ruled by Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So. 3d 
695 (Miss. 2009). 
 274. Brown, 729 S.E.2d at 227. 
 275. Id. See Covenant Health Rehab of Picayune, L.P. v. Brown, 949 So. 2d 732, 737 (Miss. 2007) 
overruled by Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So. 
3d 695 (Miss. 2009); Gainsville, 857 So. 2d at 284. 
 276. Harris, 183 F.3d at 181. 
 277. See Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 381 (2001). 
 278. Harris, 183 F.3d at 181; Brown v. Genesis Healthcare, 729 S.E.2d 217, 227 (W. Va. 2012). 
 279. Brown, 729 S.E.2d at 228 (“Procedural unconscionability often begins with a contract of adhe-
sion.”). 
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negotiate the terms.280  Contracts of adhesion offered on this “take-it-or-leave-it ba-
sis”281 are not per se unconscionable.282  Nevertheless, a contract of adhesion 
strongly suggests a contract is procedurally unconscionable since contracts of ad-
hesion suggest a lack of “meaningful choice” by the parties.283  Still, a contract of 
adhesion by itself does not always require a finding of procedural unconscionabil-
ity.284  Rather, contracts of adhesion require further analysis to determine whether 
they should be enforced.285 
ii. Substantive Unconscionability 
Courts assess substantive unconscionability by looking at the contract terms 
themselves and determining “whether the terms of the agreement are commercially 
reasonable, fair, and consistent with public policy.”286  Contract terms that are un-
duly harsh and one-sided,287 or so “outrageously unfair as to shock the judicial con-
science”288 suggest that a contract is substantively unconscionable.  Oppressive con-
tract terms also evidence substantive unconscionability; oppression exists when un-
equal bargaining power “results in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful 
choice.”289  Substantively unconscionable contracts may include oppressive terms 
that deprive one party of all the benefits of the contract or leave one party without 
a remedy for the other party’s breach or nonperformance.290  Contracts of adhesion, 
or contracts and drafted by the dominant party – usually on printed forms – and 
presented on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis to the other party who has no real chance 
                                                          
 280. Id. 
 281. State ex rel. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., Inc., 329 P.3d 658, 669 (N.M. 2014). 
 282. See In re Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc., 257 S.W.3d 228 (Tex. 2008); Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Ben-
field, 117 Ohio St.3d 352, 2008-Ohio-938, 884 N.E.2d 12, at ¶ 50. 
 283. Gainesville Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Weston, 857 So. 2d 278, 285 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (quot-
ing Powertel, Inc. v. Bexley, 743 So. 2d 570, 575 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)). 
 284. VoiceStream Wireless Corp. v. U.S. Commc’ns, Inc., 912 So. 2d 34, 40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
 285. Am. Food Mgmt., Inc. v. Henson, 434 N.E.2d 59, 63 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (“Finding that there is 
an adhesion contract is the beginning point for analysis, not the end of it; what courts aim at doing is 
distinguishing good adhesion contracts which should be enforced from bad adhesion contracts which 
should not.”). 
 286. Strausberg v. Laurel Healthcare Providers, LLC, 304 P.3d 409, 417-18 (N.M. 2013); Repair Mas-
ters Const., Inc. v. Gary, 277 S.W.3d 854, 858 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Prieto v. Healthcare & Ret. Corp. 
of Am., 919 So. 2d 531, 533 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
 287. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 340 (2011); State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 
194 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Mo. 2006); Funding Sys. Leasing Corp. v. King Louie Int’l, Inc., 597 S.W.2d 
624, 634 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979). 
 288. Prieto, 919 So. 2d at 533. 
 289. Flores, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 381; Funding, 597 S.W.2d at 634; People by Abrams v. Two Wheel 
Corp., 525 N.E.2d 692, 695 (1988); State ex rel. Vincent v. Schneider, 194 S.W.3d 853, 858 (Mo. 2006) 
(en banc); Brewer, 364 S.W.3d at 492-93. 
 290. See Covenant Health & Rehab. of Picayune, LP v. Estate of Moulds ex rel. Braddock, 14 So. 3d 
695, 699-700 (Miss. 2009).  An example of an unconscionable one-sided agreement would be one that 
allows one party to go to sue in court, but restricts the other to arbitration. See Pridgen v. Green Tree 
Fin. Servicing Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 655, 658 (S.D. Miss. 2000).  See also McFarland v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, N.A., 810 F.3d 273, 279 (4th Cir. 2016) (“A contract term is substantively unconscionable only if 
it is both ‘one-sided’ and ‘overly harsh’ as to the disadvantaged party.”); Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 
183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Substantive unconscionability refers to contractual terms that are 
unreasonably or grossly favorable to one side and to which the disfavored party does not assent.”). 
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to negotiate the terms,291 are not automatically substantively unconscionable but 
they do make it easier to prove that the contract is substantively unconscionable.292 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite the Supreme Court’s holding in Marmet v. Health Care Center, Inc. v. 
Brown that states cannot prohibit pre-dispute arbitration agreements of personal in-
jury or wrongful death claims against nursing homes because it would be a “cate-
gorical rule” that is “contrary to the terms and coverage of the FAA,”293 arbitration 
in nursing home contracts continues to be challenged.294  Unconscionability, signa-
tory issues, and applicability to third-parties constitute the more successful defenses 
raised against enforcing arbitration agreements in nursing home contracts.  Since 
total prohibition of such agreements contradicts the Supreme Court’s holding, a 
better solution includes educating potential residents and attorneys about the impli-
cations of these agreements and the strategies to combat enforcement.  Specifically, 
attorneys should work to prevent enforcement of unfair arbitration agreements 
against vulnerable nursing home residents and their families by relying on defenses 
discussed in this article.295  Discussing and educating the public, community lead-
ers, state employees, elder law attorneys, and healthcare workers about the risks of 
mandatory arbitration in nursing home admission contracts can help mitigate the 
risks involved in signing these provisions. 
Another option is to eliminate wrongful death actions from mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements in nursing home contracts.  Such action would only change the 
forum for resolving their disputes rather than sacrificing plaintiffs’ rights in the ad-
missions process.296  In wrongful death actions, beneficiaries should have the ability 
to choose the forum for seeking justice for the negligence that lead to the death of 
a friend or family member.297 
There are other ways to ensure fairness in both the arbitration agreement and 
the admission process besides excluding wrongful death actions from nursing home 
arbitration agreements.298  The use of fair and unambiguous model arbitration agree-
ments in nursing home admission contracts could help remedy the problem.  The 
American Healthcare Association, the largest association of long term care provid-
ers in the country,299 has suggested “best practices” for arbitration in nursing home 
admission contracts, “recommending voluntary agreements that are set apart from 
the admission document and that include rescission language.”300  Such “best prac-
tices” would allow nursing homes to enjoy the cost-saving benefits of arbitration 
                                                          
 291. E. Ford, Inc. v. Taylor, 826 So. 2d 709, 716 (Miss. 2002). 
 292. Moulds, 14 So. 3d at 701. 
 293. Marmet Health Care Ctr, Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530, 532-33 (2012) (per curiam). 
 294. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. 
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 296. Scheller, supra note 91, at 572. 
 297. Scheller, supra note 91, at 572. 
 298. See Scheller, supra note 91, at 572 (“Courts should clarify . . . who has authority to bind the party 
to arbitration upon signing the agreement. Legislatures could . . . [define] whether ‘health care decisions’ 
include agreements to arbitrate.”). 
 299. Am. Health Care Ass’n, Who We Are, AHCA HOME, 
https://www.ahcancal.org/about_ahca/Pages/Who-We-Are.aspx (last visited April 1, 2016). 
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without compromising the treatment and quality of care of nursing home resi-
dents.301 
Since many adults will either enter nursing homes themselves or arrange such 
care for a loved one, and all taxpayers will have to bear the increasing costs of 
healthcare, the problems associated with mandatory arbitration agreements in nurs-
ing home admission contracts have the potential to affect the entire country.  Such 
high stakes require careful, pragmatic, and balanced approaches to addressing arbi-
tration in nursing home contracts will help ensure that nursing homes can provide 
adequate care to residents and that plaintiffs can find adequate resolution of disputes 
through the legal system. 
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